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EQUnY
though he did have intercourse with his wife at the approximate time of
conception."
In Langel v. Langel45 the husband sued for divorce and denied pater-
nity of the child. The testimony of the parties on access at the time of
conception was in conflict, and the court accepted blood tests as relevant
to corroborate the husband's testimony of no access at time of conception
(and thus indirectly, on the issue of paternity). The court also held that
the wife was not entitled to a jury trial on the issue, and that the appoint-
ment of a guardian ad litem is not necessary to protect the rights of the
child. On this last point, some states do require the appointment where
the legitimacy of a child born to a married woman is in issue, but the gen-
eral rule is that it is not necessary, because the child is not a party to the
divorce action and the decision is not binding on his right to inherit from
the husband.
The second case in which the presumption was rebutted, Koch v.
Miller,4" was a probate court decision on the legitimacy and inheritance
rights of a child born to a married woman. After the birth of the child,
the marriage was terminated by divorce and the mother remarried a man
whom she had known while married, and who accepted the child as his
own. The court held that the clear evidence of acknowledgement of
paternity by the second husband was enough to rebut the presumption
that he was not her father, and the child was allowed to inherit from
him.
4 7
HUGH A. Ross
EQUITY
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
Injunctive Relief - Criminal Conspiracy
The most important and most widely publicized equity case to come
before the Ohio Supreme Court in 1961 was State ex rel. Chalfin v.
Glick.' A county board of education sought an injunction as a matter of
right against an Amish school system. The board sought to enforce mini-
mal state educational attendance standards as set by state statute and by
regulations of the State Board of Education. The private Amish schools,
44. It seems clear that while blood tests are not deemed conclusive in Ohio, as they are in
some states, the validity of the tests are widely recognized and have contributed to a weaken-
ing of the presumption.
45. 175 N.E.2d 312 (Ohio App. 1960).
46. 178 N_.E2d 186 (Ohio P. Ct. 1961).
47. Ibid.
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on the other hand, refused to conform to state standards because of the re-
ligious tenets of their faith which call for an early termination of a child's
education to pursue a quiet, withdrawn way of life. The Hardin County
Common Pleas Court granted the injunction, dosed the Amish private
schools, and directed the Amish parents to send their children of com-
pulsory school age to public schools. The court of appeals reversed, de-
nying the injunction petition.
The Ohio statutes provide for the assessment of fines and/or impris-
onment of a parent who refuses to send a child of compulsory school age
to school.8 The rule is well settled in equity that an injunction is not the
proper remedy to be used to enforce criminal or penal laws.4 However,
the board of education contended that it did not have an adequate remedy
at law since (1) it would be a slow process to prosecute each parent un-
der the state statutes, and (2) the statutory penalties are not strict enough
to promote compliance. The supreme court answered these contentions
by holding that injunctive relief will not be granted simply because the
adoption of the available remedy at law would cause administrative in-
convenience and would result in a multiplicity of suits. The court also
indicated that the board's argument that injunctive relief would be more
severe than the statutory penalties was an argument against rather than
in favor of injunctive relief.
At the same time, the court recognized that the criminal nature of
an act does not completely bar equity jurisdiction if an injunction is neces-
sary to prevent irreparable injury. However, the court held that such an
injunction is not to be granted as a matter of right but rests with the dis-
cretion of the court. The board claimed that such an irreparable injury
existed because (1) the refusal of the Amish parents to send their chil-
dren to school amounted to a criminal conspiracy to subvert the morals of
their children, and (2) the operation of Amish schools under such condi-
tions constituted a public nuisance. The court held that no evidence had
been presented to support either contention, and in affirming the decision
of the court of appeals, ruled that in the absence of express statutory di-
rection, the court of appeals had not abused its discretion by refusing to
grant the injunction.
The board's contention of "conspiracy to subvert the morals of the
Amish children" seems out of line with the stipulation of all parties to
the action that the establishment of the Amish schools had been dictated
solely by the tenets of the Amish faith, conscience, and religious convic-
tions. Its contention illustrates the fact that the questions of equity juris-
1. 172 Ohio St. 249, 175 N.E.2d 68 (1961).
2. Oio REv. CODE §§ 3321.02-.04, .07.
3. OHIO REV. CODE §5 3321.38, .99, 4109.99.
4. 43 CJ.S. Injunctions § 150 (1945); 29 O. JUL. 2d IWounctions 5 104 (1958).
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diction raised by this case have arisen from a basic conflict between re-
ligion and education.
Injunctive Relief - Upholding Deed Restrictions
Although restrictions on the use of property are not generally fa-
vored, the Ohio courts continue to invoke equity jurisdiction to enforce
restrictions which are dearly indicated by covenants in a deed. In Swi-
gart v. Richards5 the defendant planned to place a house trailer on a lot
within an allotment which restricted each lot to a single family "build-
ing" maintained as a residence. The plaintiff, an owner of property in
the allotment, sought an injunction to exclude the trailer. Her petition
alleged that the trailer was not a "building;" thus it violated the allot-
ment's deed restrictions which confined parcel use to "buildings." The
court set forth an extended discussion on the development of mobile
homes, but ultimately decided that despite modern accessories "it would
take a heap o' claustrophilia to make a trailer a home."' Under the facts
in this case it held that a trailer was a vehicle and did not fit the defini-
tion of "building" intended by the parties drafting ihis allotment's deed
restrictions. Use of the trailer was enjoined.
In Myers v. Smith7 deed restrictions were enforced by a matter of
inches. The defendant wished to attach a garage to his home which
would extend to within one foot of the sideline of plaintiff's lot. The
allotment's deed restrictions would not permit a building to be closer than
five feet unless it was a detached garage. Testimony indicated that eighty
of the eighty-five garages in the allotment were less than five feet from
their neighbor's sideline. However, the rule is well established in Ohio
that as long as there is substantial value in a deed restriction, it will be
enforced despite numerous existing violations.8 The Myers court felt
that the plaintiff's property would benefit by having the restriction en-
forced; therefore, it granted the request for an injunction. Plaintiff had
objected promptly to his neighbor's plans and could in no way be con-
sidered guilty of laches despite his failure to object to similar violations
by others in the allotment.
Injunctive Relief - Special Assessments
The hilly terrain around Athens, Ohio, caused construction difficulties
for engineers constructing a sewer and brought forth a flood of equity
suits from the property owners assessed with the cost. Drainage in the
5. 87 Ohio L. Abs. 37 (C.P. 1961).
6. Id. at 39.
7. 112 Ohio App. 169, 171 NXE.2d 744 (1960).
8. Brown v. Huber, 80 Ohio St. 183, 88 N.E. 322 (1909); Romig v. Modest, 102 Ohio
App. 225, 142 NE.2d 555 (1956). See also 15 0. JuR. 2d Covenants § 138 (1955).
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sewer district under consideration flowed in four separate directions,
necessitating four sewers instead of one. An unusually high cost resulted.
In Dorman v. Kincaid9 the plaintiffs sought to enjoin the assessments on
several grounds, the most important being that the costs exceeded the
benefits to the property assessed. At one time it was the law in Ohio that
a court of equity could not enjoin an assessment as long as the property
was benefited to some extent."0 However, Ohio Revised Code section
727.04 clearly indicates that assessments shall not be in excess of the
benefits conferred upon the property by the assessment." The court in
Dorman v. Kincade upheld recent cases which have ruled that if an as-
sessment is in excess of the benefit, payment of the excess should be en-
joined.12 The Dorman court enjoined the portions of assessments which
would exceed one-third of the expected value of the property after the
sewer construction."3 Moreover, the court enjoined the complete assess-
ment on lots being used as a driveway since the sewer conferred no direct
benefit on the lots themselves. As a result, property owners were not as-
sessed for sewer costs according to the amount of property owned. Rather,
the court felt it equitable to fully assess only those properties which were
being, or probably would be, used for homes since they would be the ones
actually to benefit from the new sewer.
Injunctive Relief - Protection of Trade Marks
and Trade Secrets
Confidential customer lists are regarded as trade secrets, and they may
be protected from disclosure by the granting of an injunction. 4 Thus,
in Hance v. Peacock,'" an employee was enjoined from contacting those
customers on his former employer's customer list who had contracts with
the employer. He was enjoined even though there was no express pro-
vision not to compete in his employment contract. However, equity is a
two-way street - "He who seeks equity must do equity." The court en-
joined the employee from contacting customers under contract with his
former employer, but it also required the employer to clarify his relations
9. 176 N.E.2d 872 (Ohio C.P. 1961).
10. Baxter v. Van Houter, 115 Ohio St. 288, 153 N.E. 266 (1926); Rogers v. Johnson, 21
Ohio App. 292, 153 N.E. 167 (1926).
11. This section provides that "assessments under section 727.03 of the Revised Code shall
not be in excess of the special benefits conferred upon such lots and lands by the public im-
provement mentioned in such section .
12. Cristo v. City of Niles, 170 Ohio St. 59, 162 N.E.2d 521 (1959); Laskey v. Hilty, 91
Ohio App. 136, 107 N.E.2d 899 (1951).
13. Ohio Revised Code section 727.15 provides: "In no case shall there be levied upon a
lot or parcel of land in the municipal corporation any assessment or assessments for any or
all purposes within a period of five years, in excess of thirty-three and one-third per cent of
the actual value thereof after improvement is made."
14. See cases cited in 29 0. JuR. 2d Injunctions §§ 98, 99 (1958).
15. 169 N.E.2d 564 (Ohio C.P. 1960).
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-with his customers. The employer's business was changing ownership.
Furthermore, it became dear from the evidence presented at the court's
hearing that many of the employer's customers had not read the provi-
sions in their contracts requiring notice of termination to be given to the
employer. Thus, the employer was required to write all his customers no-
tifying them of the change of ownership in his business and reminding
-them of their contractual obligations.
The court in Younker v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company1"
reiterated the rule that injunctive relief is extraordinary relief and that it
should not be granted unless the plaintiff has established a "clear, incon-
testable and well defined right ... ."" The plaintiff in the Younker case
operated a small local insurance agency, selling a general line of life in-
surance. The agency was incorporated under the name of "Securance
Service, Incorporated." Several years after the agency was incorporated
under that name, Nationwide began to nationally advertise a one-package
insurance program known as "Family Securance Service." Following the
appearance of this program, Securance Service, Incorporated, applied for
and was granted the trade name and trade mark rights to the word "se-
curance." It then declared its exclusive property rights to the word and
sought an injunction to prevent Nationwide from using it as a trade name
or trade mark.
The plaintiff sought the injunction despite the fact that it had only
used "securance" twice as a trade mark; once in a high school newspaper
advertisement at a cost of one dollar, and once on calendar cards at a cost
of fifteen dollars per five hundred. On all other occasions the plaintiff's
advertising had promoted the corporate name or the individual officers of
the company.
The basis of the plaintiff's injunction petition was unfair competition;
however, Nationwide is a national insurer, and the plaintiff, a local gen-
eral insurance agency. The two businesses are so different that not even
a remote possibility existed that the public would be misled into thinking
the services advertised by Nationwide were the services of Securance Ser-
vices, Incorporated. Thus, the court found that all the plaintiff had done
was to make an isolated use of a word which anyone could find in a dic-
tionary. Such a use did not indicate that the plaintiff had an incontest-
able property right which deserved injunctive protection. Moreover, the
court found that in fact Securance Services, Incorporated, was guilty of an
attempt to capitalize on Nationwide's advertising program and that its
trade mark rights to "securance" had been improperly obtained and
should be canceled.
16. 176 N.E.2d 465 (Ohio C.P. 1961). See also discussion in Trade Regulation section,
p. 537 infra.
17. Id. at 471.
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COURT OF APPEALS - EQUITY JURISDICTION
The Worthington City Council passed an ordinance in July, 1959,
changing the zoning of an area of land owned by the plaintiff to permit
commercial and apartment house construction. A month later the cti-
zens of Worthington filed a petition calling for a referendum to contest
the zoning change. The referendum was scheduled to be placed on the
ballot at the next general election in November, 1960. The plaintiff
waited until October, 1960, to file an original action for mandamus in the
court of appeals, coupled with an appeal for injunctive relief. 8 The
court of appeals has original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, but
it has no original equity jurisdiction. The court stated that in order to
enjoin the referendum election, it would be necessary for it to make an
equitable determination of the validity of the steps taken to obtain the
referendum. This it could not do since it had no original equitable juris-
diction.
The court also refused to grant the injunction because it found the
plaintiff guilty of laches. More than one year had elapsed before the
plaintiff's petition was filed, and less than a month remained from the
time of filing until the date of the general election. In view of this un-
explained delay it would have been inequitable to enjoin the referendum
when insufficient time remained to file a new referendum petition in time
for the general election.
EQUITABLE CONVERSION
The general rule of equitable conversion is that a contract to sell real
property vests the equitable title to the property in the purchaser even
though the transfer of legal title has not been completed. Therefore, if an
equitable conversion has taken place and the property is destroyed before
the contract is completely performed (if neither party is guilty of causing
the destruction), the loss must be borne by the purchaser. In Sanford v.
Breidenbach9 the parties signed a contract of sale, but while the necessary
papers were being prepared to transfer title, the home was totally de-
stroyed by fire. Included in the provisions of the contract of sale was an
agreement that funds would not be deposited in escrow by the purchaser
until the seller had furnished him with a satisfactory septic tank easement.
The easement agreement had not been furnished at the time of the fire.
Thus, when the seller sought specific performance of the contract follow-
ing the fire, both the trial court and the court of appeals refused to grant
it. The court of appeals stated that when real property is involved, the
seller must show literal and exact performance of all material acts on his
18. Friedman v. Donahue, 175 N.E.2d 525 (Ohio Ct. App. 1960).
19. 111 Ohio App. 474, 173 N.E.2d 702 (1960).
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